Summary
This article analyzes the impact of a regulatory incentive, grounded in operational experience, designed to motivate transmission agents to reschedule maintenance activities during periods that reduce operational impacts. The methodology integrates Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate operational risks, scenarios with and without incentives, and a decision logic based on expected net benefits. The model allows the system operator to estimate the feasibility of proposing a maintenance rescheduling. This approach opens the door to designing incentives that make the revised scheduling attractive without relying on regulatory mandates when technical constraints prevent maintenance from being performed as originally planned.
Read more Read lessThe results show that such adjustments can improve system efficiency. In many cases, rescheduling maintenance to early-morning hours generates benefits that could justify adopting performance-based regulation, while also improving network reliability. Thus, operational experience becomes a flexible regulatory solution for coordinating maintenance in an environment that is increasingly demanding in terms of reliability, costs, and the integration of variable energy sources.
Overall, this study provides a practical response to a persistent challenge in the Colombian power system. Although focused on a specific case, the model can be adapted to any centrally dispatched market seeking to optimize maintenance scheduling in contexts that require high operational flexibility.
Additional informations
| Publication type | Session Materials |
|---|---|
| Reference | C5_12293_2026 |
| Publication year | |
| Publisher | CIGRE |
| Country | Colombia |
| Study committees | |
| File size | 487 KB |
| Price for non member | 30 € |
| Price for member | 30 € |
Authors
AGUIRRE Darwin - xm; SALAZAR Harold - UTP
